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ABSTRACT 
Research shows that environmental attitudes can affect support for environmentally-
beneficial policies. However, it is unclear whether environmental attitudes can influence 
support for such policies when they are not being primarily framed through an 
environmental lens. Using data from the 2011 Irish National Election Study, this paper 
examines the issue using the case of support for the reintroduction of water charges. This 
was a contentious issue with debate largely focusing on the proposal as an austerity 
measure, but the proposal also had environmental implications. The results find that while 
individuals’ willingness to prioritise environmental protection over economic growth did 
not affect their support for water charges, their willingness to make individual sacrifices 
for the environment did. Moreover, voters’ position on this policy impacted their vote 
choice. The findings are particularly important given the struggles that governments are 
facing in implementing environmental taxes and charges. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, I argue that environmental attitudes can affect support for 
environmentally-beneficial policies, even which such policies are not primarily framed through 
an environmental lens in public discourse. In recent decades, much progress has been made in 
understanding how environmental attitudes and concerns are formed and the impact that these 
have on environmental behaviour. In the domain of electoral and policy research, it has been 
shown that voters’ environmental attitudes can have a decisive impact on national election 
outcomes (Bean and Kelley 1995), US representatives’ record of voting in favour of 
environmental policy in Congress (S. E. Anderson 2011) and the adoption of renewable energy 
policies by European governments (B. Anderson, Böhmelt, and Ward 2017). The mechanism 
involves individuals with environmental attitudes becoming aware of a policy’s beneficial or 
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harmful environmental implications – most often through receiving information in the public 
sphere1 - which then affects their views on the policy and, if such an environmental 
constituency becomes large enough, may have a knock-on impact on the stances taken by 
political representatives, parties and governments. 
However, certain policies have tangible environmental benefits but are framed and 
debated in public discourse primarily from a non-environmental perspective. In such cases, it 
is unclear whether the possession of environmental attitudes can impact policy support as this 
would necessitate that individuals who possess environmental attitudes look beyond the 
primary non-environmental framing of the policy that is presented to them, recognise the 
environmental implications and then choose whether or not to bring their environmental 
attitudes to bear on the question or to continue to see the issue through the dominant, alternative 
frame. Choosing to see the issue through an environmental lens may be particularly onerous 
for individuals during a period of austerity as, though they may claim to be willing to support 
policies to protect the environment, their economic needs may dominate (Singer 2011). 
I use public support for the introduction of water charges to answer such a question 
using data from the 2011 Irish National Election Study (INES). The 2011 Irish general election 
took place a few months after Ireland had entered into an EU-IMF bailout agreement and after 
considerable fiscal retrenchment had been implemented2 (Hardiman and MacCarthaigh 2013, 
10). The introduction of water charges formed a substantial point of contention during the 
election among both voters and parties but as the campaign was ‘dominated by economic 
issues, unemployment, terms of the financial bailout and management of the public finances’ 
(Reidy, Suiter, and Breen 2018, 154), most of the debate revolved around the policy’s 
                                                 
1 Obtaining such knowledge may also play a role in the development of environmental attitudes to begin with. 
2 Between 2008 and 2011 an estimated overall fiscal adjustment of €21 billion had already been made in the 
context of a 2012 GNP of approximately €130 billion 
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economic and social implications. However, from both the perspective of incentivising water 
conservation and providing finances to deal with outdated infrastructure that could prevent 
environmental damage, the policy could be expected to have tangible environmental benefits. 
Thus, this case provides the ideal opportunity to test whether environmental attitudes translate 
into support for a policy which would have a positive environmental impact when the policy is 
primarily being discussed through another frame and when its environmental effects are 
sidelined in public discourse. It is additionally a politically interesting case as the divisions 
seen on the policy in the 2011 election foreshadowed further politicisation of the issue in the 
election’s aftermath. When the government attempted to implement the charges they were 
faced with largescale protests as well as a widespread refusal to pay campaign and they would 
ultimately end up abandoning the policy (Marsh, Farrell, and Reidy 2018, 5). 
This is an important subject to examine empirically because, even though progress has 
been made, as Martinsson and Lundqvist (2010, 520) note, ‘most existing empirical studies 
concentrate on the attitudinal and value dimension of ecological citizenship, and put less 
emphasis on whether these attitudes are also translated into environmentally responsible 
behaviour’. It is also one with important policy implications given the difficulties that 
governments are facing in implementing environmental taxes and charges. 
I begin by analysing broad public support for environmental taxes and charges and 
providing contextual information on the Irish case before detailing the data, presenting the 
results and finally providing some conclusions. Specifically, I test whether individuals who 
professed a higher level of support for the environment were more likely to support water 
charges, whether any effect found differs depending on the dimension of environmental support 
being captured and whether support for water charges impacted vote choice. The results show 
that being willing to make individual sacrifices played an important role in support for the 
policy and that views on this policy had an impact on vote choice. 
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2. Literature Review 
I begin by examining the factors that can affect whether individuals would be willing to 
pay taxes or charges on a service – including water - to protect the environment. While 
possessing an environmental attitude is important, by its own it will not necessarily spur one 
into action as there often exists a gap between individuals’ environmental attitudes and their 
environmental behaviours (Kollmuss and Agyeman 2002). Evidence from Sweden points to 
hypocritical individuals who profess green attitudes yet do not follow this through in their 
behaviour, as well as coverts who display environmental behaviour despite not possessing 
environmental attitudes (Martinsson and Lundqvist 2010). 
Environmental attitudes themselves are also not unidimensional and depending on the 
aspect of support for environmental protection that one is tapping into, one may see different 
effects. Daniels et al (2012) identify 16 different categories of environmental attitudes, beliefs 
and preferences and advocate that rather than seeking to uncover a single underlying construct 
among these, that researchers should treat each measure as independent as they each tap into 
distinct judgments. Given the nature of how water charges operate, one would expect the 
dimension of being willing to make individual sacrifices for the environment to be the most 
relevant dimension, though broader environmental priorities could also play a role. 
H1a Individuals who are more willing to make individual sacrifices to protect the 
environment are more likely to support the introduction of water charges. 
H1b Individuals who prioritise the environment over economic growth are more 
likely to be in favour of the introduction of water charges than those who prioritise 
economic growth over the environment 
3.1 Sociodemographic Explanations  
There are additionally a number of important sociodemographic factors that have been 
shown to be related with environmentalism. Generally speaking, women report stronger 
environmental attitudes and behaviours than men with the effect on pro-environmental 
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behaviour being consistently stronger than the effect on pro-environmental attitudes (Zelezny, 
Chua, and Aldrich 2000). Formal education has also been shown to be a powerful predictor of 
environmental knowledge, attitudes and behaviours (Diamantopoulos et al. 2003). Moreover, 
in examining individuals’ willingness to pay higher taxes in order to protect the environment 
in Spain, Torgler and García-Valiñas (2007, 546) find that ‘we have to go beyond formal 
education and includes individuals’ interest for current political matters or other proxies of 
political awareness’. 
3.2 Economic, Financial and Social Explanations 
Having the financial means to pay may also be a factor. In cross-national studies, it has 
been shown that - within countries – individuals with higher incomes are more willing to pay 
for environmental protection (Fairbrother 2013) and climate change (Mayer and Smith 2017). 
It is also posited that environmental protection is a luxury good that people value during good 
economic times when they feel they can afford it but deprioritise when the economy declines 
(Abou-Chadi and Kayser 2017). In support of this, an experimental study in Britain shows that 
individuals are more likely to prioritise action on climate change when they perceive the 
economy to be performing well (Kenny 2018). Thus, during harsh economic conditions it may 
be particularly onerous for individuals to support costly environmental policies. 
When it comes to water charges specifically, introducing water charges that aim 
towards full cost recovery is particularly beneficially for altering consumer behaviour. Doing 
so shows the consumer the resource’s cost and dispels perceptions that it is cost-free which 
may prove especially effective in encouraging water conservation during the more price-elastic 
summer months (OECD 2003, 52). Despite the potential such a policy has for water 
conservation, the public may be more sceptical of such an outcome occurring. Dresner et al. 
(2006, 901) find that the public see environmental taxes more broadly ‘solely as a means of 
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raising revenue, rather than in terms of their incentive effects’ and that ‘many people could not 
understand that a tax on energy would have benefits for the environment even if the revenues 
went to labour tax reductions’. Additionally, focus groups have shown that some people 
question environmental taxes if they do not have any effect on behaviour (Kallbekken and 
Aasen 2010, 2189), with such reservations having the ability to be offset if the money raised is 
earmarked for environmental purposes (Kallbekken and Sæælen 2011, 2967). Recent evidence 
from the UK however finds that the earmarking of such revenue for environmental protection 
in general does not increase support for environmental taxes, speculating that the specificity of 
environmental earmarking may be important (Fairbrother 2019). 
One reason for introducing water charges can be to raise money that is earmarked towards 
addressing infrastructural issues in the water network which would have many environmental 
benefits. However, users are less willing to pay for water tariffs if they believe they are being 
charged for inefficiencies within the system (OECD 2009, 50). Thus, the irony of the finding 
that earmarking money raised by environmental taxes for environmental purposes may increase 
support for water charges is that it may be necessary to introduce water charges to address 
system inefficiencies, but users may be even less willing to be charged if the inefficiencies 
have not been addressed first. 
While the economic and environmental implications of the proposal for introducing 
water charges have been discussed, the social dimension is also important. Water is needed to 
provide for basic human needs and thus introducing charges may particularly affect households 
that are already struggling financially. The OECD (2003) notes that if poorer individuals are 
finding their water bills to be too expensive, they may reduce their consumption to levels that 
do not provide for their basic needs which in turn may negatively affect public health and/or 
increase levels of financial stress. While from an income equality perspective one would expect 
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that poorer households should not pay a bigger percentage of their income on water services, 
in reality water charges inevitably lead to such an outcome. Barth, Finseraas and Moene (2015, 
566) posit that when voters below the mean income level experience declining incomes, they 
may feel the burden of attending to their urgent, material needs and may be less willing to pay 
higher taxes to finance welfare spending. Thus, especially in the context of increasing financial 
insecurity, one would expect that lower income households would be amongst the least 
supportive of water charges. 
H2 Individuals who are most likely to be experiencing the greatest financial 
hardship will be among the least likely to support the introduction of water charges. 
3.3 Ideology and Partisanship 
The role of ideology and partisanship must also be considered. Traditionally, left-leaning 
or liberal individuals are more disposed towards environmental protection than right-leaning 
or conservative individuals (Van Liere and Dunlap 1980), though the relationship has been 
found to differ in its consistency across different cross-national contexts (Fairbrother 2016). 
Research from Sweden suggests that such an effect is largest when individuals are confronted 
with an explicit environmental-protection and economic growth trade-off (Harring and 
Sohlberg 2017). 
Above individuals’ ideological leanings, the positions that parties take can be important. 
While parties campaign on issues they have a positional advantage on, they also gravitate 
towards issues that are salient to the public (Green and Hobolt 2008, 464). During a period of 
austerity, one would expect parties to frame their policy positions through a pro- or anti-
austerity lens that is likely to resonate with public sentiment. Once parties have decided on 
their platforms, Carsey and Layman (2006) demonstrate that if individuals are aware of party 
differences but do not find the issue to be particularly important that they should bring their 
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own attitudes in line with the party position. However, when they are aware of party differences 
on an issue and deem it to be important, they may switch their party allegiances to match their 
issue preferences. Applying this to water charges, one would expect partisanship to matter for 
approval of water charges whether it is the case that those with strong preferences on the policy 
vote for parties that hold the same position or whether those that did not hold strong preferences 
updated their preferences to reflect that of their party. 
H3 Individuals who support parties campaigning for the introduction of water 
charges are more likely to support water charges themselves than individuals who 
support parties campaigning against the introduction of water charges. 
Following on from this literature review, I will now present the details of the Irish case 
that is the focus of the paper. 
3. Water Charges and the 2011 Election in Ireland 
December 1996 saw the announcement of the abolition of domestic water and sewerage 
charges in Ireland, with the costs of water supply subsequently provided through general 
taxation. The charges had become unpopular amongst certain sectors for reasons including 
fixed charges due to the absence of meters and thus the lack of a relationship between charges 
and quantity used, the large bills when they arrived due to infrequent billing and a lack of a 
standardised method for dealing with vulnerable families (Scott 2003). Growing opposition 
and the rise in electoral support for anti-water charges candidates as evidenced in by-elections 
in the run up to a general election placed pressure on the government to react which paved the 
way for abolition. 
Such a policy was detrimental for the financing of water infrastructure. When water 
systems are operating inefficiently and have an insufficient amount of revenue, one can expect 
inadequate operation and maintenance of infrastructure which will eventually have a knock-on 
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effect on services (OECD 2009, 50). Though Ireland has plentiful water resources, a lack of 
investment had left the infrastructure outdated and led to serious leakage problems. The 
average age of Irish water mains is 65-85 years compared to a European average of 36 and the 
country had a 2011 average leakage rate of 41 per cent compared to the usual OECD range of 
10-20 per cent (Expert Commission on Domestic Public Water Services 2016, 7/8; OECD 
2009, 49). The infrastructural issues also have further impacts on substandard water treatment, 
with a 2017 report from the Environmental Protection Agency finding that 44 urban areas were 
directly discharging raw sewage with harmful effects for public health, aquatic ecosystems and 
the waters’ amenity value (Environmental Protection Agency 2017). The decision to abolish 
domestic water charges also came at the beginning of the Celtic Tiger period of rapid economic 
growth which increased the strain and demand on the system in tandem with government 
policies that failed to encourage conservation (Zhao and Crosbie 2012, 429). Thus, while a 
populist policy that may have been electorally pleasing, abolishing domestic water charges was 
not economically or environmentally beneficial. 
While an outbreak of Cryptosporidium hominis in the Galway area in 2007 due to 
inadequate water treatment and its detrimental economic, environmental and social effects 
(Morris et al. 2016) brought high public salience to the issue of water infrastructure and its 
deficiencies, it was not until the economy entered into recession following the 2008 financial 
crisis that domestic water charges seriously returned to the political agenda, primarily as a 
finance-raising mechanism. The speech for the 2010 budget announced that the then Fianna 
Fáil-Green Party government was preparing to introduce water charges to broaden the tax base 
which would be based on consumption above a certain free allowance (Lenihan 2009). Upon 
entering into an EU-IMF bailout deal twelve months later, the government further set out that 
it was ‘planning to move towards full cost-recovery in the provision of water services’ (Ireland 
2010, 8) as well as moving water provision from local government to a centralised water utility. 
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This set the scene for the introduction of water charges to play a major part of the general 
election campaign of February 2011. 
Before detailing the parties’ stances on water charges, it is helpful to provide some 
context on the political parties and the nature of party competition in Ireland. Fianna Fáil was 
the dominant party from 1932 to 2011 and had never been out of government for more than 
one consecutive election up until this point. Its policy platforms are so similar to those of its 
main rival Fine Gael - the only other party to lead a government – that it is often difficult to 
define what differentiates the two parties. Each party combines elements of conservatism, 
Christian democracy and social democracy and are best classified as ‘catch-all’ parties (Weeks 
2010). The Labour party has existed in the shadow of Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil and, despite 
being a social democratic party, its support base had become increasingly cross-class over the 
latter decades of the 20th century. Where social bases of support were most clearly seen prior 
to the 2011 election was in support for the smaller parties of Sinn Féin who received more 
support from working-class and the Green party who received more support from middle-class 
voters (Marsh 2010). 
An unusual feature of the Irish system is its remarkably low levels of partisanship which 
have been steadily declining in recent decades. In 2007, only a quarter of voters reported feeling 
close to a party whereas the equivalent range in countries across Western Europe, North 
America, New Zealand and Australia is between 50 and 80 per cent (Marsh 2010, 172). With 
such low levels of party attachment, as Marsh et al (2008, 79) noted following analysis of the 
2002 INES data, ‘short-term factors therefore have an increasing potential to make a big impact 
on Irish elections’. Taken together with the finding that potential support for each party is 
shared across at least one competitor and ‘most voters could be said to be effectively ‘in 
competition’, fought over by several parties’ (Marsh 2010, 169), issue controversies may 
matter more in Irish elections even during ‘regular’ elections. 
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The 2011 general election was not a regular election though, being described as 
‘Ireland’s earthquake election’ (Gallagher 2011) due to a dramatic realignment of the party 
system. Fianna Fáil lost their dominant position with a historically low vote share – down over 
24 per cent on the previous election – having received the blame for the country’s severe 
economic downturn and their junior coalition party – the Green Party - lost all of their six seats. 
Indeed, the election had been the third most volatile election to have occurred among long-
standing European democracies since 1945 and unusually one that did not result in the 
establishment of any new major party (Mair 2011). While the initial defection concerned 
performance politics, the destination of the defection was about positional politics (Tilley and 
Garry 2017, 20) and thus the policy signals that opposition parties sent out were even more 
important than usual in attracting voters. 
With the environment being a low salience issue in the election – evidenced by only 
one respondent in the 2011 INES mentioning environmental issues as the most important issue 
to them personally – and issues of the economy and austerity dominating, these latter frames 
were where more votes could be expected to be won and it is through this lens that parties 
justified their positions on water charges. The Labour Party, Sinn Féin and the United Left 
Alliance3 all framed their opposition to water charges through the lens of the financial burden 
that such charges would place on struggling households, with the Labour Party additionally 
pointing out that the water infrastructure should be improved before any metering is 
implemented, tapping into the sentiment referred to previously that individuals may be 
particularly against water charges if they feel they are being charged for an inefficient service. 
While the Labour Party also contained separate, explicit environmentalist appeals in its 
manifesto, such commitments were almost completely absent from Sinn Féin’s manifesto.  
                                                 
3 An alliance of smaller socialist parties. 
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Meanwhile, Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil both supported the policy primarily from the 
perspective of raising revenue for the troubled public finances. While Fine Gael did commit to 
using revenues garnered from the charges to fund the delivery of clean and safe water, the 
policy was also contained in the section of their manifesto entitled ‘Cutting the Deficit by 
Broadening the Tax Base’. The only mention of water charges in the Fianna Fáil manifesto was 
the economic benefits the installation of water meters would provide through creating jobs, 
though their renewed programme for government a few months previously had also touted it 
as a means to raise local government revenue. Thus, for both of these parties, environmental 
motivations were not the drivers of their support. The only party to explicitly campaign for 
water charges primarily on an environmental front was the Green Party, who was also the only 
party to emphasise in their manifesto the conservation impact that the introduction of water 
charges could have through altering consumer behaviour. 
In this electoral environment, it is quite a hard test to see whether individuals’ 
environmental attitudes could impact their support for the policy when its environmental 
implications received at best peripheral attention in the campaign. 
4. Data 
This paper uses data from the 2011 INES. The survey was carried out in the aftermath 
of the general election on a representative national sample through face-to-face interviews with 
a total of 1,853 respondents. A self-complete drop-off questionnaire was additionally included, 
which 91 per cent of respondents completed (see Marsh, Farrell, and McElroy 2017 for further 
details on the survey and the survey questionnaire). When analysing the data, I make use of the 
demographic and political weights provided. This section details the questions being utilised 




4.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable asks, ‘Thinking about each of the following, and bearing in 
mind that government might need more revenue in order to maintain spending levels on public 
services, would you be in favour of, or opposed to, the introduction of each one of these 
measures in order to raise revenue for the public finances? - water charges4’. The responses 
were in favour, opposed or don’t know5. The frame focuses individuals’ minds on the harsh 
economic conditions the country was experiencing and whether the introduction of specific 
finance-raising measures was a favoured solution. Thus, in some ways, this question could be 
seen as measuring pro- versus anti-austerity sentiment. However, if one was sympathetic to the 
introduction of water charges primarily from an environmental perspective, one would still 
expect such respondents to answer that they were in favour of such a charge. If the 
environmental perspective was to encourage water conservation, then if that was achieved 
alongside an increase in public revenue through the introduction of water charges, the financial 
benefits for the state would be a desirable by-product. And if the environmental perspective 
was that the money raised could be reinvested back into water infrastructure to improve the 
quality and supply of water, then such a policy may also be desirable.  
4.2. Independent Variables 
I use three environmental measures, each of which taps into a different environmental 
dimension, to examine whether environmental attitudes impacted support for water charges. 
The first question taps into individuals’ willingness to sacrifice their standard of living to 
protect the environment by asking them to place themselves on a scale from strongly disagree 
(1) to strongly agree (7) in response to the statement, ‘I would be willing to accept a cut in my 
                                                 
4 The other measures in this battery were property tax, the sale of state assets and the reintroduction of student 
fees. The order in which these were read was rotated. 
5 67 respondents – representing 3.6 per cent of the full sample - answered ‘don’t know’ to this question and have 
been treated as missing. 
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standard of living in order to protect the environment’6. The second question asks respondents 
on the same 1-7 scale to respond to the statement that, ‘I would be willing to pay much higher 
taxes in order to protect the environment’. A key difference between these questions is that 
though respondents indicate a willingness to take on a significant extra tax burden to protect 
the environment, by doing so they do not necessarily foresee that this will negatively affect 
their standard of living. These two variables are moderately correlated at a value of 0.38. The 
third question taps into a policy-level trade-off by asking respondents to place themselves on a 
scale between ‘We should encourage economic growth even if this damages the environment’ 
(recoded as 0) and ‘We should protect the environment even if this damages economic growth’ 
(recoded as 10). In the context of the question, those who answered ‘don’t know’ have been 
treated as the middle category7. The trade-off dimension is weakly correlated to each of the 
first two environmental indicators with correlation coefficients of 0.14 and 0.12 respectively. 
All of these questions were asked in different parts of the questionnaire. 
Partisanship is primarily measured using the party respondents feel close to and, if 
respondents said no to this question, if there is any party they feel closer to than others. With 
this question, one is able to approximate partisan identity. This is categorised into Fianna Fáil, 
Fine Gael, the Labour Party, Sinn Féin, and other/none8. The party one gave their first 
preference vote to/would have given their first preference vote to if they did not vote is also 
used both as a robustness check and for other analysis with the same categories, with the 
exception that ‘other’ is separated from ‘refused/don’t know’ categories due to ‘other’ being 
large enough to include as a standalone category. Finally, as a further robustness test,  I use a 
                                                 
6 This question was part of the drop-off questionnaire 
7 For robustness, I have carried out the subsequent analysis where these respondents are instead treated as 
missing and neither the co-efficient nor the p-value changes substantively.  
8 The other category [including those that felt closer to a particular party but would not name the party] only 




series of questions asking respondents how likely they are to ever give their first preference 
vote to each political party on a 0-10 scale (those who answered ‘don’t know’ have been coded 
as the middle category 5) which captures electoral utility (van der Eijk et al. 2006). This allows 
me to examine whether individuals’ views on water charges were associated with how they 
considered all parties as opposed to restricting their choice to the party they voted for or felt 
closest to. It importantly allows me to include small but notable parties – namely the Green 
Party and the United Left Alliance – who played a visible role in the election campaign but did 
not receive enough national level support to give reliable estimates through the questions in the 
other models. 
To capture individual hardship, the following measures are used: Annual gross 
household income ranging on an eight-point scale from less than €20,000 to greater than 
€75,0009; employment status (full-time employed, part-time employed, unemployed and 
seeking work, student, retired and engaged in home duties); and accommodation type (home 
owner without a loan or mortgage, home owner with a loan or mortgage, local authority tenant, 
private tenant and other). Accommodation type is relevant as a number of individuals were 
living in negative equity following the collapse of the housing bubble. 
To capture respondents’ subjective perceptions on the tax versus spending scale – as 
one would expect that individuals who are more supportive of increasing taxes in general would 
also be more supportive of introducing water charges - I use the question, ‘I would like you to 
look at the scale from 0 to 10 on this card. A ‘0’ means government should MAINTAIN 
TAXES and SPEND LESS on health and social services, and ‘10’ means government should 
INCREASE TAXES A LOT and SPEND THE SAME on health and social services. Where 
would you place yourself in terms of this scale?’. In the context of the economic conditions, 
                                                 
9 While originally asked on a 10-point scale, the three highest categories of €75,000-€99,000, €100,000-€149,000 
and €150,000+ have been merged together due to power issues. 
16 
 
this question confronts respondents with the reality that maintaining taxes may not mean 
maintaining the same level of services. Those who responded ‘don’t know’ to this question 
have been classified as equivalent to those who answered the middle ‘5’ category. 
A number of controls are also used. Age is included as a continuous variable, gender as 
being either male or female and formal education is included using a question that asked 
individuals to state their highest educational level achieved to date (primary, junior certificate 
or equivalent, leaving certificate or equivalent, diploma or certificate and university degree or 
equivalent). To capture political interest, I include individuals’ subjective interest in politics 
ranging from ‘not at all interested’ (1) to ‘very interested’ (4) and political awareness is proxied 
by the number of days per week respondents listen to national radio news. 
In addition to examining determinants of support for water charges, at the end of the 
paper I examine whether support impacted voters' first preference choice. Additional controls 
used here include social class (ab, c1, c2, d, e, f50+, f50-), living in an urban or rural area, 
objective political knowledge (on a scale from 0-3 where 0 means individuals got three political 
questions wrong and 3 means that individuals got 3 political questions right), belief in God (on 
a scale of 0 ‘definitely does not exist’ to 10 ‘definitely does exist’ with ‘don’t knows’ 
recategorised as ‘5’), what one considered to be the most important issue for the respondent in 
the election (coded into being let down by the political system, public services, macro-
economy/public finances, employment/labour, taxes/personal cuts and other/don’t know) and 
whether the respondent considered the change in the state of the economy over the past four 
years to have been mainly due to government policy, not mainly due to government policy or 
that they don’t know. 
5. Results 
I begin by presenting some descriptive statistics. In Table 1, one can see the reported 
levels of support for water charges broken down by one’s vote/intended vote in the 2011 
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general election. The policy was unpopular amongst the majority of the population. Overall, 
only 35 per cent were in favour of it. However, this is still relatively substantial given that 
signing up to new charges is unlikely to be popular at the best of times, never mind during a 
period of intense economic and financial insecurity10. While no party had a majority of their 
supporters in favour of the charge, parties in favour of the policy have bigger proportions of 
their supporters who are in favour with 41 per cent for Fine Gael and 39 per cent for Fianna 
Fáil voters. On the other end of the spectrum, support was only 13 per cent among Sinn Féin 
voters. Meanwhile, support is closer to the average for both Labour Party voters and voters of 
‘other’ parties and independents. Thus, at an initial glance, partisanship is playing a role as 
expected. 
Table 1: Support for Water Charges by 2011 Vote/Vote Intention (%) 
 FG FF Lab SF Ind Other None All 
Party Position on Water Charges For For Against Against N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Support 41 39 34 13 34 34 33 35 
Opposition 59 61 66 87 66 66 67 65 
% Column Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Number of Respondents 615 293 328 168 207 102 73 1786 
   
To ascertain whether environmental protection preferences played a role in support for 
water charges, figure 1 breaks down each of the three environmental protection questions into 
whether individuals gave an environmental response, the midpoint answer or a non-
environmental response and within each of these categories displays the percentage of 
respondents that expressed support for or opposition to the introduction of water charges. From 
the first chart, it appears that those who disagree with accepting cuts in their standard of living 
to protect the environment are less likely to support water charges than those who would agree 
to cuts or are unable to decide. The second chart shows that those who agree to paying higher 
taxes to protect the environment are more likely to support water charges than those who 
                                                 
10 The level of support for the other items in the battery were 40 per cent for the sale of state assets, 22 per cent 
for property tax and 14 per cent for reintroducing student fees. 
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disagree to paying such taxes or are undecided. Finally, there is very little difference in support 
for water charges among those who would choose to either prioritise economic growth or 
environmental protection. Though preliminary, it appears that the environmental dimension 
related to making personal sacrifices for the environment may be the dimension that matters 
for supporting water charges. 
Figure 1: Support for Water Charges by Measures of Environmental Support 
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 Table 2 presents logistic regressions carried out with the dependent variable being 
support for water charges. Each model contains just one of the environmental protection 
measures firstly on their own and secondly with the inclusion of the other independent 
variables. The results demonstrate a significant relationship between support for water charges 
and respondents’ stated willingness to make personal sacrifices for the environment both when 
they are included on their own and when the other explanatory and control variables are added 
Table 2: Logistic Regression of Support for Water Charges 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Coef Se Coef Se Coef se Coef Se Coef Se Coef se 
             
Env Standard of Living 0.34*** (0.04) 0.27*** (0.04)         
Env Higher Taxes     0.18*** (0.03) 0.11*** (0.03)     
Economy v. Environment         0.04* (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 
             
Party Close (FG)             
FF   0.32 (0.24)   0.34 (0.22)   0.32 (0.22) 
Labour   -0.47 (0.29)   -0.36 (0.26)   -0.42 (0.28) 
SF   -0.92** (0.38)   -1.04*** (0.36)   -1.06*** (0.38) 
Other/None   -0.21 (0.17)   -0.27* (0.16)   -0.30* (0.19) 
             
Income (<€20,000)             
€20,000-24,999   0.27 (0.28)   0.36 (0.27)   0.37 (0.27) 
€25,000-29,999   0.04 (0.31)   0.21 (0.29)   0.21 (0.29) 
€30,000-34,999   0.11 (0.28)   0.07 (0.26)   0.08 (0.26) 
€35,000-39,999   0.33 (0.32)   0.35 (0.30)   0.44 (0.29) 
€40,000-49,999   0.66** (0.28)   0.82*** (0.26)   0.78*** (0.26) 
€50,000-69,999   0.59** (0.27)   0.80*** (0.25)   0.79*** (0.25) 
>€70,000   0.83** (0.36)   0.87*** (0.33)   0.84** (0.33) 
Refused to answer   0.44** (0.21)   0.58*** (0.19)   0.58*** (0.19) 
             
Unemployed             
Full Time Employed   0.31 (0.25)   0.37 (0.24)   0.38 (0.23) 
Part Time Employed   0.52* (0.28)   0.56** (0.26)   0.56** (0.26) 
Student   0.23 (0.35)   0.29 (0.34)   0.33 (0.34) 
Retired   0.44 (0.33)   0.46 (0.30)   0.46 (0.30) 
House Duties   0.41 (0.30)   0.44 (0.28)   0.43 (0.28) 
             
House Owner/No Mortgage             
Owner with loan/mortgage   -0.29* (0.15)   -0.30** (0.14)   -0.28** (0.14) 
Local Authority Tenant   -0.65** (0.30)   -0.65** (0.28)   -0.67** (0.27) 
Private Tenant   0.26 (0.24)   0.27 (0.22)   0.29 (0.23) 
Other   -0.12 (0.53)   -0.15 (0.48)   -0.18 (0.50) 
             
Tax v. Spending   0.08** (0.03)   0.06** (0.03)   0.07** (0.03) 
             
             
Constant -1.66*** (0.13) -4.44*** (0.61) -1.18*** (0.11) -3.83*** (0.56) -0.82*** 0.12 -3.73*** (0.56) 
           
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.15 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.12 
Observations 1,563 1,563 1,738 1,738 1,743 1,743 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: The following controls as described in the data section (age, gender, education, political interest and the number of days per week 
respondents listen to national radio news) are included in the model but the coefficients are not displayed in the table due to reasons of space. 




in11. The strength of this relationship is greater for being willing to accept a lower standard of 
living than for being willing to pay much higher taxes. However, respondents’ willingness to 
prioritise environmental protection over economic growth does not affect their support. This 
suggests that respondents have the ability to differentiate between micro- and macro-level 
environmental actions and to then link the micro-level environmental actions with paying for 
water. Thus H1a is accepted and H1b is rejected. 
Next, I examine the coefficients for the party one feels close to. Here, support for water 
charges is not statistically significantly different between supporters of the Fine Gael and 
Fianna Fáil parties who both advocated for such a policy. However, supporters of Sinn Féin – 
a party that was against the water charges - are significantly less likely to support the measure, 
and while the coefficient for the Labour party – a party that was also against the charges - is 
not statistically significant compared to the reference displayed of Fine Gael partisans as 
displayed, it is significant at the p<0.05 level compared to Fianna Fáil partisans. While this 
party closeness variable is the most appropriate for capturing partisanship, as a robustness test 
the models were also run using the party individuals gave their first preference vote to (see 
online appendix Table A2) and similar findings emerge with the main difference being that 
there is a statistically significant difference between Labour Party voters and Fine Gael voters 
in these models12. Thus, H3 is accepted. 
On experiencing financial hardship, the indicators generally show that such individuals 
are less likely to support water charges. Higher income earners are more likely to support the 
                                                 
11 The relationship additionally remains robust if any single explanatory or control variable is removed. 
12 As a further robustness test, a set of models substituted this question for questions asking respondents how 
likely they are to ever give their first preference vote to each political party. These models show (see online 
appendix Table A3) that individuals’ preferences for the introduction of water charges maps onto their dispositions 
towards each of the parties in that those who support the policy are more likely to be willing to give their first 
preference vote to parties who also support the policy (significant at the p=0.05 level in all models for likelihood 
to ever give first preference vote to Fianna Fáil and the Green party, though only at the 0.10 level in some models 
for Fine Gael) while being less likely to support parties that opposed the policy (significant at the p=0.01 level for 
likelihood to ever give first preference to Sinn Féin and the United Left Alliance, though only at the p=0.10 level 
for the Labour Party). 
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policy, local authority tenants are the least likely to support the policy and, though the 
significance levels are inconsistent across the models, there is some indication that home 
owners with loans/mortgages are less likely to support water charges than those without such 
burdens. Employment status does not behave as expected, with the unemployed only being 
significantly less likely at the p<0.05 level than those who are part-time employed to support 
the charges and at that only in two of the three models. 
To demonstrate the magnitude of these effects, predicted probabilities are calculated 
based on models 2 & 4 where significant effects were found for the respective environmental 
questions, keeping every other variable at their mean value. These are plotted in figure 2. In 
each case, as one’s answer to the environment question increases, one’s probability of 
supporting water charges also increases. The effect is more pronounced for the cuts to standard 
of living question where keeping everything else in the model at its mean value, one has a 22 
per cent probability of supporting water charges if one responds lowest on the environmental 
scale, whereas the corresponding figure for those who respond highest on the environmental 
scale is 58 per cent. For the willingness to pay taxes to protect the environment questions, if 
one is highly unwilling to pay taxes for this purpose, keeping everything else in the model at 
its mean value, one has a 27 per cent probability of supporting water charges whereas the 










Figure 2: Predicted Probabilities of Supporting Water Charges by Environmental Attitudes 
 
A further point of curiosity is found in an additional test (Table A4 in the online 
appendix) in which partisanship is interacted with the environmental support variables.  Here, 
though Labour Party partisans are in general less likely to support water charges in line with 
party policy, Labour party partisans who are more willing to make individual sacrifices for the 
environment are more likely to support the policy. This highlights some polarisation among 
Labour party partisans. On the one hand, some may have evaluated the policy based on the 
socialist lens upon which the party based their policy position or indeed just followed the party 
cue. On the other hand, as the Labour Party also promotes environmental protection, members 
who are disposed towards environmental protection appear to have ignored party cues and 
instead made their judgment independently based on environmental considerations. Such an 
effect is not present for other partisans, though it is present for nonpartisans. 
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One lingering concern is that the environmental questions could capture more of a 
willingness to ‘make sacrifices for the common good’ dimension rather than tapping 
specifically into a willingness to make sacrifices for the environment. As previously 
mentioned, the water charges question was asked as part of a battery that also asked about 
support for property tax, selling state assets and reintroducing student fees to raise revenue for 
the public finances. Applying my models on these policies that do not have an environmental 
element – as I have done in Tables A5-A7 in the online appendix - allows the opportunity to 
more robustly test my theory. 
While not significant for supporting the reintroduction of student fees, both of the 
individual-level environmental variables – though not the macro-level trade-off variable - are 
positively correlated to support for the sale of state assets, though being willing to accept a cut 
in one’s standard of living to protect the environment – with a coefficient of 0.11 – is at a much 
lower magnitude than the coefficient of 0.27 in the water charges model. For supporting 
property tax, all three environmental variables are statistically significant. Being willing to 
accept a drop in one’s standard of living is still at a much lower magnitude, but the magnitude 
of the coefficient for being willing to pay higher taxes at 0.22 is notably higher. Given the 
moderate correlation between support for water charges and property tax (0.38)13 it should not 
be surprising that they should share some of the same correlates, though it raises the question 
as to whether environmental dispositions are playing a role in support for water charges beyond 
a general ‘ willingness to sacrifice’ element. 
There are good reasons to believe that they are. Firstly, the environmental question that 
taps into the biggest individual-level sacrifice – being willing to accept a drop in one’s standard 
of living – is by far the most important environmental indicator of support for water charges, 
                                                 
13 Support for water charges correlates at 0.28 and 0.18 with support for the reintroduction of student fees and 
the sale of state assets respectively. 
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while being less important for the other policies. Secondly,  political interest and awareness are 
known correlates of a willingness to pay environmental taxes (Torgler and García-Valiñas 
2007) and out of the four policies analysed, my indicators of these are only consistently 
significant for water charges support (see online appendix Tables A1;A5-A7). Thirdly, I have 
shown that Labour partisans – a party who had both environmentalist and socialist appeals - 
that were more willing to make individual sacrifices for the environment were more likely to 
support water charges against the party’s official position. As Table A8 in the online appendix 
shows, there is no such interaction effect between being a Labour partisan and expressed 
environmental positions for support for property taxes; a policy for which Labour partisans’ 
environmental views should not divide them. Thus, while a general willingness to make 
sacrifices for the common good may be captured by the environmental questions – which 
explains their significant association with support for some of the other policies – the evidence 
also points to a clear environmental dimension in water charges support beyond this. 
While this paper has shown that environmental attitudes can explain support for water 
charges, a final question is whether support for water charges affected vote choice. To examine 
this, a multinomial logistic regression is carried out in which the dependent variable of 
individuals’ reported actual or intended vote is regressed on a range of variables that could 
influence vote choice plus the water charges question. If the water charges question has a 
statistically significant impact upon vote choice after controlling for all of these other variables, 
then one can be confident that attitudes towards the proposed policy had an impact upon voter 
behaviour. In a second model, the variable of respondents’ reported first preference vote at the 
2007 general election is included. This is one of the best predictors for explaining current vote 
preference and so including this provides an even stronger test on whether voters’ views on 
water charges influenced their vote choice as well as an opportunity to approximate whether 
parties’ positions on this policy enabled them to attract new voters.   
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Figure 3 displays the coefficients for the support for water charges variable that is of 
interest from these models with Fine Gael being used as the reference category14. In the first 
model that does not include respondents’ reported vote choice at the previous election one can 
see that whether or not one supports water charges is a statistically significant distinguishing 
factor in voting behaviour with individuals who voted for the Labour Party or Sinn Féin over 
Fine Gael being less likely to support the introduction of domestic water charges in line with 
party policy. The water charges variable is not a significant indicator for explaining why one 
voted for Fine Gael over Fianna Fáil - both of which supported the introduction of the policy - 
and neither is it for voting for independents or others over Fine Gael which could be expected 
due to the different policy positions taken within each of these categories on the policy15. 
In the second model, the party individuals reported giving their first preference to in 
the previous general election is included. Notably, this results in the pseudo R2 increasing from 
0.12 to 0.28 indicating its importance for explaining one’s 2011 first-preference vote. The 
water charges variable is no longer statistically significant in this model for explaining why 
people voted for the Labour Party, indicating that their stance on this issue was not important 
for attracting new voters. From the data, one cannot say for definite whether it may have been 
important for retaining existing voters. The coefficient remains statistically significant for 
explaining why one voted for Sinn Féin over Fine Gael (as well as other parties with a change 
of baseline) with a sizeable magnitude, suggesting that the party’s stance on this played a key 
role for them in attracting new voters. As Sinn Féin distinguished themselves from the other 
                                                 
14 The output for the other variables can be found in the online appendix in Table A9 for the first model and 
Table A10 for the second model. 
15 If the reference category is instead set as Fianna Fáil, support for water charges is not a statistically significant 
indicator for distinguishing voting for Fianna Fáil over Labour in the model. However, given the negative 
campaigning that was engaged by the Labour Party in the closing stages of the campaign with their ‘Fine Gael – 
Every Little Hurts’ slogan that specifically attacked Fine Gael’s austerity measures including water charges 
(Leahy 2011, 85/86) – and given the other variables in the model including the economic voting indicator that one 




main parties by rejecting the bailout agreement outright (Gallagher 2011, 150) of which the 
proposed introduction of water charges was a well-known component of, the significance of 
water charges for the Sinn Féin vote likely reflects their success in positioning themselves as a 
vehicle for anti-austerity votes. Thus, these models suggest that support for the reintroduction 
of water charges had an important role to play in individuals’ vote choice, but only 
unambiguously so for Sinn Féin. 
Figure 3: Support for Water Charges Coefficients from Multinomial Logistic Regression 
models explaining 2011 General Election First Preference Vote/Vote Intention 
 
Note: The reference category in the multinomial logistic regression is Fine Gael. The figure displays the 
coefficients for support for water charges with 95% confidence intervals. In addition, both models contain 
additional control covariates. Tables displaying the full outputs can be found in the online appendix in Tables 
A9 and A10. 
 
6. Conclusion  
In this paper, I demonstrate that a willingness to make individual sacrifices for the 
environment was related to greater support for the reintroduction of water charges in Ireland in 
2011. The magnitude of the effect is greater for being willing to sacrifice one’s standard of 
living for the sake of the environment than being willing to pay higher taxes for the 
environment. Meanwhile, the macro-level trade-off dimension between prioritising economic 
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growth over environmental protection has no effect. Given that the policy would involve 
individuals being financially worse off from the policy, it appears that it is individuals’ 
willingness to bear such a burden if they can expect it to lead to environmental gains that 
matters. 
These results are especially important given the unfavourable context that made it a 
particularly hard test. Ireland was in the midst of a severe economic crisis and had recently 
entered into an EU-IMF bailout deal having already implemented a number of substantial 
austerity measures over the previous years. Despite the environmental benefits of the policy in 
encouraging water conservation and raising revenue to address infrastructural problems, under 
such bleak conditions the economy dominated even more than usual. While the proposal 
received prominent attention during the election campaign, the environmental aspects of the 
policy were not prominently highlighted with debate instead focusing on its economic and 
social implications. Thus, it was quite an onerous task for individuals to bring their 
environmental attitudes to bear on their support for this environmentally-beneficial policy 
when its environmental consequences were side-lined in the election campaign and the framing 
of the question they answered focused on the proposal as a finance-raising mechanism. The 
fact that an association was found between support for water charges and environmental 
attitudes under such conditions is particularly compelling. 
I also investigated whether support for the policy may have influenced vote choice in 
the 2011 general election, which was especially important given the high level of electoral 
volatility. While such an effect on vote choice was found, this was only conclusively so for 
voters of Sinn Féin. The fact that Fine Gael won the election despite campaigning for a policy 
that was widely unpopular – even amongst its own voters – and that their support for this policy 
did not appear to lose them first-preference votes to their main electoral competitor in the 
Labour Party indicates that parties may suggest some unpopular policies without being 
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punished electorally for doing so. This may give grounds for parties to incorporate 
environmental protection policies even if public support for such policies is not present. 
However, the difficulties in executing the water charges policy once in government and the 
subsequent reversal of the policy displays the challenge of implementing deeply unpopular 
policies even when you have a mandate. Such challenges are likely to increase in relevance 
over the coming years given the growing need for governments worldwide to implement a 
range of costly environmental policies if they are to meet the ambitious climate change targets 
that they have set themselves. Therefore, putting in place programmes to boost the 
environmental dispositions of citizens in advance of implementing costly environmental 
protection policies may lead to greater success rates for such top-down initiatives. 
In conclusion, this paper demonstrates that – even during a period of heightened 
economic insecurity - the publics’ expressed willingness to make personal sacrifices in order 
to protect the environment is more than an empty or meaningless response, but has important 
implications for their support of a policy with tangible environmental benefits even when such 
a policy is largely being framed through an alternative lens and its environmental implications 
are side-lined in public discourse. 
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Environmentalism undercover: The environmental dimension of public support 
for domestic water charges 
 Online Appendix  
Table A1: Logistic Regression of Support for Water Charges with Party Closeness – Full Models 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Coef Se Coef Se Coef se 
       
Env Standard of Living 0.27*** (0.04)     
Env Higher Taxes   0.11*** (0.03)   
Economy v. Environment     0.03 (0.02) 
       
Party Close (FG)       
FF 0.32 (0.24) 0.34 (0.22) 0.32 (0.22) 
Labour -0.47 (0.29) -0.36 (0.26) -0.42 (0.28) 
SF -0.92** (0.38) -1.04*** (0.36) -1.06*** (0.38) 
Other/None -0.21 (0.17) -0.27* (0.16) -0.30* (0.19) 
       
Income (<€20,000)       
€20,000-24,999 0.27 (0.28) 0.36 (0.27) 0.37 (0.27) 
€25,000-29,999 0.04 (0.31) 0.21 (0.29) 0.21 (0.29) 
€30,000-34,999 0.11 (0.28) 0.07 (0.26) 0.08 (0.26) 
€35,000-39,999 0.33 (0.32) 0.35 (0.30) 0.44 (0.29) 
€40,000-49,999 0.66** (0.28) 0.82*** (0.26) 0.78*** (0.26) 
€50,000-69,999 0.59** (0.27) 0.80*** (0.25) 0.79*** (0.25) 
>€70,000 0.83** (0.36) 0.87*** (0.33) 0.84** (0.33) 
Refused to answer 0.44** (0.21) 0.58*** (0.19) 0.58*** (0.19) 
       
Unemployed       
Full Time Employed 0.31 (0.25) 0.37 (0.24) 0.38 (0.23) 
Part Time Employed 0.52* (0.28) 0.56** (0.26) 0.56** (0.26) 
Student 0.23 (0.35) 0.29 (0.34) 0.33 (0.34) 
Retired 0.44 (0.33) 0.46 (0.30) 0.46 (0.30) 
House Duties 0.41 (0.30) 0.44 (0.28) 0.43 (0.28) 
       
House Owner/No Mortgage       
Owner with loan/mortgage -0.29* (0.15) -0.30** (0.14) -0.28** (0.14) 
Local Authority Tenant -0.65** (0.30) -0.65** (0.28) -0.67** (0.27) 
Private Tenant 0.26 (0.24) 0.27 (0.22) 0.29 (0.23) 
Other -0.12 (0.53) -0.15 (0.48) -0.18 (0.50) 
       
Tax v. Spending 0.08** (0.03) 0.06** (0.03) 0.07** (0.03) 
       
Age 0.01** (0.01) 0.01** (0.01) 0.01** (0.01) 
       
Female -0.36*** (0.14) -0.27** (0.13) -0.27** (0.13) 
       
Education (primary)       
Junior Certificate  0.22 (0.30) 0.11 (0.28) 0.09 (0.27) 
Leaving Certificate 0.67** (0.29) 0.46* (0.27) 0.46* (0.26) 
Diploma/Certificate 0.94*** (0.31) 0.72** (0.28) 0.73*** (0.28) 
University 1.13*** (0.32) 1.07*** (0.29) 1.09*** (0.29) 
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Political Interest (Not at all)       
Not Very 0.34 (0.28) 0.42 (0.26) 0.39 (0.26) 
Quite Interested 0.76*** (0.26) 0.86*** (0.25) 0.86*** (0.24) 
Very Interested 0.88*** (0.30) 1.00*** (0.28) 1.00*** (0.28) 
       
Days listen to national radio per week 0.09*** (0.03) 0.07*** (0.03) 0.08*** (0.03) 
       
Constant -4.44*** (0.61) -3.83*** (0.56) -3.73*** (0.56) 
      
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.13 0.12 
Observations 1,563 1,738 1,743 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 






Table A2: Logistic Regression of Support for Water Charges with 2011 Vote/Vote Intention 
   (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Coef se Coef se Coef se 
       
Env Standard of Living 0.26*** (0.04)     
Env Higher Taxes   0.12*** (0.03)   
Economy v. Environment     0.03 (0.02) 
       
2011 Vote (FG)       
FF 0.07 (0.18) 0.10 (0.17) 0.08 (0.16) 
LAB -0.44*** (0.17) -0.35** (0.16) -0.37** (0.16) 
SF -1.10*** (0.28) -1.26*** (0.26) -1.25*** (0.26) 
IND -0.16 (0.21) -0.20 (0.20) -0.20  (0.20) 
Other -0.09 (0.31) -0.03 (0.29) -0.02 (0.29) 
Refused/Don’t Know -0.23 (0.31) -0.16 (0.28) -0.26 (0.27) 
       
Income (<€20,000)       
€20,000-24,999 0.19 (0.28) 0.30 (0.27) 0.30 (0.27) 
€25,000-29,999 0.01 (0.31) 0.18 (0.29) 0.18 (0.29) 
€30,000-34,999 0.05 (0.29) 0.03 (0.27) 0.04 (0.27) 
€35,000-39,999 0.28 (0.32) 0.32 (0.30) 0.40 (0.29) 
€40,000-49,999 0.57** (0.29) 0.74*** (0.27) 0.71*** (0.27) 
€50,000-69,999 0.53* (0.27) 0.75*** (0.25) 0.73*** (0.25) 
>€70,000 0.73** (0.37) 0.79** (0.33) 0.76** (0.33) 
Refused to answer 0.40* (0.21) 0.55*** (0.20) 0.55*** (0.20) 
       
Unemployed       
Full Time Employed 0.31 (0.25) 0.33 (0.24) 0.35 (0.23) 
Part Time Employed 0.52* (0.28) 0.56** (0.26) 0.55** (0.26) 
Student 0.26 (0.36) 0.32 (0.34) 0.36 (0.34) 
Retired 0.48 (0.33) 0.47 (0.30) 0.47 (0.30) 
House Duties 0.39 (0.29) 0.39 (0.28) 0.38 (0.28) 
       
House Owner/No Mortgage       
Owner with loan/mortgage -0.29* (0.15) -0.29** (0.14) -0.27* (0.14) 
Local Authority Tenant -0.59* (0.30) -0.59** (0.28) -0.60** (0.28) 
Private Tenant 0.26 (0.24) 0.28 (0.23) 0.29 (0.23) 
Other -0.13 (0.53) -0.17 (0.48) -0.19 (0.49) 
       
Tax v. Spending 0.07** (0.03) 0.06** (0.03) 0.07** (0.03) 
       
Age 0.01** (0.01) 0.01** (0.01) 0.01** (0.01) 
       
Females -0.36*** (0.14) -0.28** (0.13) -0.27** (0.13) 
       
Education (primary)       
Junior Certificate  0.29 (0.30) 0.19 (0.27) 0.18 (0.27) 
Leaving Certificate 0.70** (0.29) 0.50* (0.26) 0.50* (0.26) 
Diploma/Certificate 0.96*** (0.30) 0.74*** (0.28) 0.75*** (0.28) 
University 1.14*** (0.31) 1.09*** (0.29) 1.12*** (0.28) 
       
Political Interest (Not at all)       
Not Very 0.31 (0.28) 0.40 (0.26) 0.38 (0.26) 
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Quite Interested 0.74*** (0.26) 0.84*** (0.25) 0.85*** (0.24) 
Very Interested 0.92*** (0.29) 1.06*** (0.28) 1.07*** (0.28) 
       
Days listen to national radio per week 0.10*** (0.03) 0.08*** (0.03) 0.09*** (0.03) 
       
Constant -4.39*** (0.59) -3.86*** (0.54) -3.76*** (0.54) 
       
Psuedo R2 0.15 0.13 0.13 
Observations 1,563 1,738 1,743 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A3: Logistic Regression of Support for Water Charges with Probability to Ever Vote 
for a Party 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Coef se Coef se Coef se 
       
Env Standard of Living 0.27*** (0.04)     
Env Higher Taxes   0.12*** (0.03)   
Economy v. Environment     0.03 (0.02) 
       
Prob FF 0.06*** (0.02) 0.05** (0.02) 0.05*** (0.02) 
Prob FG 0.05** (0.02) 0.04* (0.02) 0.04* (0.02) 
Prob Green 0.07** (0.03) 0.09*** (0.03) 0.10*** (0.03) 
Prob Labour -0.05* (0.03) -0.04* (0.02) -0.04* (0.02) 
Prob SF -0.08*** (0.02) -0.10*** (0.02) -0.10*** (0.02) 
Prob IND -0.01 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02) 
Prob ULA -0.12*** (0.03) -0.11*** (0.03) -0.11*** (0.03) 
       
Income (<€20,000)       
€20,000-24,999 0.20 (0.28) 0.30 (0.28) 0.30 (0.28) 
€25,000-29,999 -0.02 (0.31) 0.13 (0.29) 0.12 (0.29) 
€30,000-34,999 0.01 (0.29) 0.02 (0.27) 0.02 (0.27) 
€35,000-39,999 0.25 (0.33) 0.31 (0.31) 0.38 (0.31) 
€40,000-49,999 0.60** (0.28) 0.73*** (0.27) 0.69** (0.27) 
€50,000-69,999 0.49* (0.27) 0.69*** (0.26) 0.67*** (0.26) 
>€70,000 0.57 (0.37) 0.61* (0.34) 0.57* (0.34) 
Refused to answer 0.38* (0.21) 0.52*** (0.20) 0.51*** (0.20) 
       
Unemployed       
Full Time Employed 0.13 (0.26) 0.17 (0.24) 0.20 (0.24) 
Part Time Employed 0.37 (0.28) 0.41 (0.27) 0.43 (0.27) 
Student 0.14 (0.37) 0.20 (0.35) 0.27 (0.35) 
Retired 0.29 (0.34) 0.31 (0.31) 0.32 (0.31) 
House Duties 0.25 (0.30) 0.25 (0.29) 0.25 (0.29) 
       
House Owner/No Mortgage       
Owner with loan/mortgage -0.25 (0.15) -0.25* (0.15) -0.23 (0.15) 
Local Authority Tenant -0.56* (0.31) -0.58** (0.29) -0.59** (0.29) 
Private Tenant 0.33 (0.25) 0.32 (0.23) 0.32 (0.23) 
Other -0.16 (0.57) -0.23 (0.53) -0.27 (0.55) 
       
Tax v. Spending 0.09*** (0.03) 0.07*** (0.03) 0.08*** (0.03) 
       
Age 0.01** (0.01) 0.01** (0.01) 0.01** (0.01) 
       
Females -0.42*** (0.14) -0.35*** (0.13) -0.34*** (0.13) 
       
Education (primary)       
Junior Certificate  0.25 (0.30) 0.17 (0.28) 0.15 (0.28) 
Leaving Certificate 0.72** (0.29) 0.52** (0.27) 0.52** (0.26) 
Diploma/Certificate 1.05*** (0.31) 0.82*** (0.28) 0.82*** (0.28) 
University 1.23*** (0.32) 1.15*** (0.29) 1.17*** (0.29) 
       
Political Interest (Not at all)       
Not Very 0.30 (0.28) 0.41 (0.26) 0.39 (0.26) 
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Quite Interested 0.71*** (0.26) 0.83*** (0.25) 0.84*** (0.25) 
Very Interested 0.90*** (0.30) 1.04*** (0.29) 1.06*** (0.28) 
       
Days listen to national radio per week 0.10*** (0.03) 0.08*** (0.03) 0.09*** (0.03) 
       
Constant -4.46*** (0.65) -3.73*** (0.59) -3.69*** (0.59) 
       
 0.17 0.15 0.15 
Observations 1,563 1,738 1,743 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Table A4: Logistic Regression of Support for Water Charges with Interactions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Coef se Coef se Coef se 
       
       
Env Standard of Living 0.12 (0.09)     
Env Higher Taxes   0.08 (0.08)   
Economy v. Environment     -0.07 (0.06) 
       
Party Close (FG)       
FF 0.50 (0.54) 0.51 (0.48) -0.34 (0.49) 
Labour -2.31*** (0.82) -1.60*** (0.73) -1.42** (0.65) 
SF -0.65 (0.75) -0.22 (0.63) -0.95 (0.75) 
Other/None -0.98*** (0.39) -0.44** (0.35) -0.90** (0.37) 
       
Party Close (FG) * Env SoL       
FF -0.06 (0.14)     
Labour 0.50** (0.21)     
SF -0.08 (0.20)     
Other/None 0.22** (0.10)     
       
Party Close (FG) * Env Tax       
FF   -0.06 (0.13)   
Labour   0.34** (0.18)   
SF   -0.25 (0.16)   
Other/None   0.05 (0.09)   
       
Party Close (FG)*Env Econ        
FF     0.13 (0.09) 
Labour     0.19* (0.10) 
SF     -0.02 (0.13) 
Other/None     0.11* (0.06) 
       
Income (<€20,000)       
€20,000-24,999 0.25 (0.28) 0.36 (0.27) 0.39 (0.27) 
€25,000-29,999 0.01 (0.31) 0.21 (0.29) 0.21 (0.29) 
€30,000-34,999 0.08 (0.29) 0.07 (0.27) 0.10 (0.26) 
€35,000-39,999 0.25 (0.32) 0.34 (0.30) 0.44 (0.29) 
€40,000-49,999 0.61** (0.28) 0.82*** (0.27) 0.79*** (0.26) 
€50,000-69,999 0.54** (0.27) 0.80*** (0.25) 0.79*** (0.25) 
>€70,000 0.82** (0.36) 0.84** (0.33) 0.82** (0.33) 
Refused to answer 0.41** (0.21) 0.57*** (0.20) 0.57*** (0.19) 
       
Unemployed       
Full Time Employed 0.35 (0.25) 0.39 (0.24) 0.36 (0.23) 
Part Time Employed 0.58** (0.28) 0.57** (0.26) 0.55** (0.26) 
Student 0.27 (0.36) 0.28 (0.34) 0.34 (0.34) 
Retired 0.47 (0.33) 0.47 (0.31) 0.44 (0.30) 
House Duties 0.43 (0.30) 0.44 (0.28) 0.41 (0.28) 
       
House Owner/No Mortgage       
Owner with loan/mortgage -0.29* (0.15) -0.30** (0.14) -0.29** (0.14) 
Local Authority Tenant -0.65** (0.30) -0.62** (0.28) -0.71*** (0.27) 
Private Tenant 0.27 (0.24) 0.27 (0.23) 0.28 (0.23) 
42 
 
Other -0.20 (0.55) -0.20 (0.49) -0.20 (0.50) 
       
Tax v. Spending 0.08** (0.03) 0.06** (0.03) 0.07** (0.03) 
       
Age 0.01** (0.01) 0.01** (0.01) 0.01** (0.01) 
       
Females -0.35** (0.14) -0.28** (0.13) -0.25* (0.13) 
       
Education (primary)       
Junior Certificate  0.25 (0.30) 0.12 (0.28) 0.09 (0.27) 
Leaving Certificate 0.67** (0.29) 0.48* (0.27) 0.45* (0.26) 
Diploma/Certificate 0.96*** (0.31) 0.74*** (0.28) 0.72*** (0.28) 
University 1.15*** (0.32) 1.09*** (0.29) 1.09*** (0.29) 
       
Political Interest (Not at all)       
Not Very 0.38 (0.28) 0.41 (0.26) 0.38 (0.26) 
Quite Interested 0.76*** (0.26) 0.84*** (0.25) 0.85*** (0.24) 
Very Interested 0.88*** (0.29) 0.98*** (0.28) 1.00*** (0.28) 
       
Days listen to national radio per week 0.09*** (0.03) 0.07*** (0.03) 0.08*** (0.03) 
       
Constant -3.92*** (0.67) -3.78*** (0.62) -3.17*** (0.63) 
       
Pseudo-R2 0.15 0.13 0.12 
Observations 1,563 1,738 1,743 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 






Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table A5: Logistic Regression of Support for Student Fees 
   (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Coef se Coef se Coef se 
       
Env Standard of Living 0.06 (0.05)     
Env Higher Taxes   0.04 (0.05)   
Economy v. Environment     0.02 (0.03) 
       
Party Close (FG)       
FF 0.54* (0.29) 0.52* (0.27) 0.52 (0.27) 
Labour -0.41 (0.40) -0.40 (0.38) -0.43 (0.38) 
SF 0.32 (0.40) 0.28 (0.38) 0.27 (0.38) 
Other/None 0.01 (0.23) -0.07 (0.22) -0.08 (0.22) 
     -  
Income (<€20,000)       
€20,000-24,999 -0.40 (0.40) -0.30 (0.39) -0.31 (0.39) 
€25,000-29,999 -0.40 (0.39) -0.13 (0.38) -0.12 (0.38) 
€30,000-34,999 -0.23 (0.37)  0.01 (0.34) 0.02 (0.34) 
€35,000-39,999 -0.32 (0.41) -0.39 (0.42) -0.27 (0.40) 
€40,000-49,999 -0.19 (0.37)  0.03 (0.35) 0.03 (0.35) 
€50,000-69,999 0.02 (0.33) 0.25 (0.32) 0.25 (0.32) 
>€70,000 -0.04 (0.43)  0.16 (0.41) 0.17 (0.41) 
Refused to answer 0.05 (0.25) 0.23 (0.23) 0.25 (0.23) 
       
Unemployed       
Full Time Employed -0.01 (0.32) -0.28 (0.28) -0.27 (0.28) 
Part Time Employed 0.09 (0.35) -0.15 (0.32) -0.12 (0.31) 
Student -0.19 (0.52) -0.66 (0.50) -0.65 (0.50) 
Retired -0.32 (0.42) -0.45 (0.38) -0.45 (0.37) 
House Duties -0.11 (0.41) -0.20 (0.37) -0.20 (0.36) 
       
House Owner/No Mortgage       
Owner with loan/mortgage -0.36* (0.21) -0.35* (0.20) -0.34* (0.20) 
Local Authority Tenant -0.09 (0.37) -0.16 (0.35) -0.17 (0.35) 
Private Tenant 0.10 (0.33) -0.01 (0.32) -0.00 (0.32) 
Other -0.96 (0.98) -0.09 (0.63) -0.10 (0.64) 
       
Tax v. Spending 0.05 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04) 0.04 (0.03) 
       
Age 0.02*** (0.01) 0.02** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.01) 
       
Females -0.17 (0.18) -0.15 (0.17) -0.15 (0.17) 
       
Education (primary)       
Junior Certificate  -0.21 (0.37) -0.13 (0.34) -0.12 (0.34) 
Leaving Certificate 0.25 (0.35) 0.11 (0.32) 0.12 (0.32) 
Diploma/Certificate 0.18 (0.37) 0.14 (0.35) 0.18 (0.35) 
University 0.82** (0.37) 0.80** (0.34) 0.83** (0.34) 
       
Political Interest (Not at all)       
Not Very 0.27 (0.36) 0.53 (0.35) 0.44 (0.34) 
Quite Interested 0.44 (0.35) 0.59* (0.34) 0.51 (0.33) 
Very Interested 0.49 (0.39) 0.66* (0.38) 0.59 (0.37) 
DK/No Reply 1.28 (1.24) 1.22 (1.19) 1.06 (1.20) 
       
Days listen to national radio per week 0.07* (0.04) 0.04 (0.04) 0.05 (0.04) 
       
Constant -4.06*** (0.75) -3.54*** (0.69) -3.56*** (0.71) 
       
Psuedo R2 0.07 0.06 0.06  




Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Table A6: Logistic Regression of Support for Property Tax 
   (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Coef se Coef se Coef se 
       
Env Standard of Living 0.19*** (0.04)     
Env Higher Taxes   0.22*** (0.04)   
Economy v. Environment     0.14*** (0.03) 
       
Party Close (FG)       
FF 0.10 (0.24) 0.22 (0.23) 0.21 (0.22) 
Labour -0.62* (0.33) -0.51* (0.30) -0.63** (0.31) 
SF -0.32 (0.36) -0.27 (0.34) -0.34 (0.34) 
Other/None -0.58*** (0.18) -0.55*** (0.18) -0.60*** (0.17) 
       
Income (<€20,000)       
€20,000-24,999 0.08 (0.29) 0.11 (0.28) 0.08 (0.28) 
€25,000-29,999 0.01 (0.33) -0.05 (0.32) -0.02 (0.32) 
€30,000-34,999 -0.04 (0.30) -0.19 (0.28) -0.21 (0.28) 
€35,000-39,999 0.25 (0.34) 0.21 (0.33) 0.30 (0.32) 
€40,000-49,999 0.27 (0.30) 0.29 (0.29) 0.20 (0.29) 
€50,000-69,999 0.25 (0.30) 0.24 (0.28) 0.24 (0.28) 
>€70,000 -0.14 (0.43) -0.10 (0.39) -0.13 (0.38) 
Refused to answer -0.04 (0.22) -0.05 (0.21) -0.01 (0.21) 
       
Unemployed       
Full Time Employed 0.18 (0.25) 0.16 (0.24) 0.21 (0.24) 
Part Time Employed 0.30 (0.29) 0.28 (0.28) 0.32 (0.27) 
Student 0.41 (0.40) 0.70** (0.35) 0.79** (0.36) 
Retired -0.04 (0.33) -0.11 (0.31) -0.02 (0.31) 
House Duties -0.06 (0.32) -0.00 (0.30) -0.02 (0.30) 
       
House Owner/No Mortgage       
Owner with loan/mortgage -0.32* (0.17) -0.28* (0.16) -0.23 (0.16) 
Local Authority Tenant 0.62** (0.26) 0.74*** (0.25) 0.71*** (0.25) 
Private Tenant -0.28 (0.29) -0.11 (0.27) -0.03 (0.28) 
Other 1.03** (0.51) 0.85* (0.49) 0.90* (0.50) 
       
Tax v. Spending 0.12*** (0.03) 0.11*** (0.03) 0.12*** (0.03) 
       
Age 0.02*** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.01) 
       
Females -0.28* (0.15) -0.24 (0.15) -0.22 (0.14) 
       
Education (primary)       
Junior Certificate  0.62* (0.33) 0.44 (0.31) 0.44 (0.31) 
Leaving Certificate 0.91*** (0.32) 0.76** (0.30) 0.81*** (0.30) 
Diploma/Certificate 1.11*** (0.34) 0.93*** (0.32) 0.95*** (0.32) 
University 1.23*** (0.34) 1.16*** (0.32) 1.21*** (0.32) 
       
Political Interest (Not at all)       
Not Very 0.06 (0.27) -0.13 (0.25) -0.13 (0.26) 
Quite Interested 0.17 (0.27) 0.07 (0.25) 0.14 (0.25) 
Very Interested 0.52* (0.30) 0.41 (0.28) 0.47* (0.28) 
       
Days listen to national radio per week 0.03 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) 
       
Constant -4.29*** (0.65) -4.15*** (0.60) -4.46*** (0.62) 
       
Psuedo R2 0.09 0.10 0.09  




Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table A7: Logistic Regression of Support for the Sale of State Assets  
   (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Coef se Coef se Coef se 
       
Env Standard of Living 0.11*** (0.04)     
Env Higher Taxes   0.10*** (0.03)   
Economy v. Environment     -0.04 (0.02) 
       
Party Close (FG)       
FF -0.30 (0.24) -0.28 (0.23) -0.30 (0.23) 
Labour -0.05 (0.28) 0.04 (0.27) 0.02 (0.26) 
SF -0.00 (0.32) 0.00 (0.30) -0.01 (0.30) 
Other/None -0.08 (0.17) -0.10 (0.16) -0.14 (0.16) 
       
Income (<€20,000)       
€20,000-24,999 -0.31 (0.26) -0.28 (0.25) -0.27 (0.25) 
€25,000-29,999 0.38 (0.28) 0.47* (0.26) 0.43 (0.27) 
€30,000-34,999 0.13 (0.25) 0.20 (0.24) 0.17 (0.24) 
€35,000-39,999 0.12 (0.30) 0.04 (0.29) 0.11 (0.29) 
€40,000-49,999 -0.03 (0.27) 0.13 (0.25) 0.08 (0.25) 
€50,000-69,999 0.25 (0.26) 0.37 (0.24) 0.32 (0.24) 
>€70,000 0.76** 0.35) 0.84** (0.32) 0.80** (0.32) 
Refused to answer 0.01 (0.19) 0.03 (0.18) -0.01 (0.18) 
       
Unemployed       
Full Time Employed 0.34 (0.22) 0.35* (0.21) 0.36* (0.21) 
Part Time Employed 0.23 (0.26) 0.32 (0.24) 0.31 (0.24) 
Student 0.54* (0.32) 0.43 (0.30) 0.46 (0.31) 
Retired 0.12 (0.30) 0.24 (0.28) 0.22 (0.28) 
House Duties 0.14 (0.27) 0.34 (0.25) 0.35 (0.25) 
       
House Owner/No Mortgage       
Owner with loan/mortgage 0.33** (0.15) 0.29** (0.14) 0.29** (0.14) 
Local Authority Tenant 0.49** (0.24) 0.51** (0.23) 0.50** (0.23) 
Private Tenant 0.50** (0.23) 0.43* (0.22) 0.42* (0.22) 
Other 0.25 (0.44) 0.36 (0.41) 0.30 (0.41) 
       
Tax v. Spending -0.13 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) -0.00 (0.03) 
       
Age 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 
       
Females 0.09 (0.13) 0.09 (0.12) 0.09 (0.12) 
       
Education (primary)       
Junior Certificate  0.01 (0.27) 0.05 (0.25) 0.02 (0.25) 
Leaving Certificate 0.03 (0.26) 0.07 (0.25) 0.04 (0.25) 
Diploma/Certificate 0.00 (0.28) 0.01 (0.26) -0.00 (0.27) 
University 0.02 (0.28) 0.13 (0.27) 0.16 (0.27) 
       
Political Interest (Not at all)       
Not Very -0.05 (0.22) 0.04 (0.21) 0.03 (0.21) 
Quite Interested 0.42* (0.22) 0.42** (0.21) 0.47** (0.20) 
Very Interested 0.26 (0.26) 0.37 (0.25) 0.42* (0.25) 
DK/No Reply -0.36 (1.11) -0.36 (1.01) -0.38 (1.07) 
       
Days listen to national radio per week -0.10 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) 0.00 (0.02) 
       
Constant -1.66*** (0.52) -1.76*** (0.50) -1.29** (0.50) 
       
Psuedo R2 0.03 0.03 0.03  
Observations 1,399 1,547 1,551  
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Table A8: Logistic Regression of Support for Property Tax with Interactions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Coef se Coef se Coef se 
       
       
Env Standard of Living 0.16* (0.09)     
Env Higher Taxes   0.17** (0.08)   
Economy v. Environment     0.14** (0.06) 
       
Party Close (FG)       
FF 0.49 (0.53) 0.13 (0.49) -0.04 (0.51) 
Labour -1.27 (0.85) -1.55** (0.78) -0.45 (0.79) 
SF 0.18 (0.73) 0.00 (0.69) 0.77 (0.75) 
Other/None -0.87** (0.42) -0.79** (0.39) -0.62 (0.41) 
       
Party Close (FG) * Env SoL       
FF -0.11 (0.14)     
Labour 0.17 (0.21)     
SF -0.17 (0.20)     
Other/None 0.08 (0.11)     
       
Party Close (FG) * Env Tax       
FF   0.02 (0.13)   
Labour   0.27 (0.19)   
SF   -0.09 (0.18)   
Other/None   0.07 (0.10)   
       
Party Close (FG)*Env Econ        
FF     0.05 (0.09) 
Labour     -0.03 (0.13) 
SF     -0.20 (0.13) 
Other/None     0.00 (0.07) 
       
Income (<€20,000)       
€20,000-24,999 0.07 (0.29) 0.10 (0.28) 0.08 (0.28) 
€25,000-29,999 0.01 (0.33) -0.06 (0.32) -0.04 (0.32) 
€30,000-34,999 -0.04 (0.30) -0.20 (0.28) -0.22 (0.29) 
€35,000-39,999 0.20 (0.35) 0.19 (0.33) 0.30 (0.32) 
€40,000-49,999 0.24 (0.31) 0.30 (0.29) 0.20 (0.29) 
€50,000-69,999 0.22 (0.30) 0.24 (0.28) 0.24 (0.28) 
>€70,000 -0.15 (0.42) -0.13 (0.40) -0.13 (0.38) 
Refused to answer -0.06 (0.22) -0.05 (0.21) -0.01 (0.21) 
       
Unemployed       
Full Time Employed 0.20 (0.26) 0.18 (0.24) 0.19 (0.24) 
Part Time Employed 0.33 (0.29) 0.30 (0.28) 0.29 (0.27) 
Student 0.42 (0.40) 0.70** (0.35) 0.79** (0.36) 
Retired -0.02 (0.33) -0.10 (0.31) -0.04 (0.31) 
House Duties -0.05 (0.32) 0.01 (0.31) -0.04 (0.31) 
       
House Owner/No Mortgage       
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Owner with loan/mortgage -0.32* (0.17) -0.28* (0.16) -0.23 (0.16) 
Local Authority Tenant 0.62** (0.27) 0.77*** (0.26) 0.66*** (0.25) 
Private Tenant -0.28 (0.30) -0.12 (0.27) -0.01 (0.28) 
Other 0.98* (0.51) 0.81* (0.49) 0.89* (0.50) 
       
Tax v. Spending 0.13*** (0.03) 0.11*** (0.03) 0.12*** (0.03) 
       
Age 0.02*** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.01) 
       
Females -0.27* (0.15) -0.25* (0.15) -0.21 (0.15) 
       
Education (primary)       
Junior Certificate  0.64** (0.32) 0.43 (0.31) 0.44 (0.31) 
Leaving Certificate 0.92*** (0.32) 0.78*** (0.30) 0.81*** (0.30) 
Diploma/Certificate 1.13*** (0.34) 0.94*** (0.32) 0.94*** (0.32) 
University 1.24*** (0.34) 1.17*** (0.32) 1.21*** (0.32) 
       
Political Interest (Not at all)       
Not Very 0.08 (0.28) -0.15 (0.26) -0.13 (0.26) 
Quite Interested 0.16 (0.27) 0.06 (0.25) 0.14 (0.25) 
Very Interested 0.51* (0.30) 0.41 (0.28) 0.49* (0.28) 
       
Days listen to national radio per week 0.02 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) 
       
Constant -4.18*** (0.71) -4.01*** (0.66) -4.44*** (0.69) 
       
Pseudo-R2 0.10 0.10 0.09 
Observations 1,540 1,696 1,701 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A9: Multinomial Logistic Regression on First Preference Vote/Vote Intention for 2011 General Election 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FF LAB SF Ind Other Refused/Don’t Know 
Reference FG             
             
Support Water Tax -0.15 (0.18) -0.33** (0.16) -1.27*** (0.25) -0.31 (0.20) -0.13 (0.26) -0.21 (0.27) 
             
Income (<€20,000)             
€20,000-24,999 -0.38 (0.36) -0.75** (0.33) -0.51 (0.36) 0.15 (0.42) -0.41 (0.45) 0.46 (0.62) 
€25,000-29,999 0.43 (0.39) -0.09 (0.35) -0.04 (0.40) 0.57 (0.47) 0.12 (0.51) 1.09* (0.66) 
€30,000-34,999 -0.02 (0.34) -0.82** (0.33) -1.13*** (0.42) 0.57 (0.39) -0.88* (0.53) 0.22 (0.65) 
€35,000-39,999 -0.22 (0.42) -0.65* (0.39) -0.74 (0.51) -0.07 (0.51) -0.14 (0.55) 0.76 (0.67) 
€40,000-49,999 -0.84** (0.41) -1.00*** (0.35) -1.19** (0.46) -0.36 (0.47) -0.65 (0.52) 0.25 (0.69) 
€50,000-69,999 -0.68* (0.39) -0.46 (0.32) -1.21** (0.51) -0.01 (0.44) -0.32 (0.46) 0.07 (0.71) 
>€70,000 0.16 (0.51) -0.59 (0.43) -13.95*** (0.40) 0.19 (0.56) -0.99 (0.73) 0.16 (0.86) 
Refused to answer -0.58** (0.28) -0.54** (0.24) -0.87*** (0.27) -0.00 (0.32) -1.26*** (0.38) 0.63 (0.50) 
             
Unemployed             
Full Time Employed 0.18 (0.32) 0.52* (0.28) -0.45 (0.32) -0.01 (0.35) -0.35 (0.43) -0.38 (0.47) 
Part Time Employed -0.08 (0.38) 0.65** (0.32) -0.16 (0.35) 0.73** (0.37) -0.25 (0.49) -0.35 (0.56) 
Student -0.10 (0.55) -0.18 (0.43) 0.09 (0.43) -0.33 (0.52) -0.08 (0.55) -1.04 (0.87) 
Retired 0.59 (0.39) 0.80** (0.37) -0.18 (0.45) 0.77 (0.48) 0.80 (0.54) 0.70 (0.65) 
House Duties -0.20 (0.37) -0.22 (0.34) -0.46 (0.37) 0.08 (0.41) -0.14 (0.50) -0.88 (0.60) 
             
Age -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.02** (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.02* (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 
             
Female -0.18 (0.19) 0.03 (0.16) -0.25 (0.21) -0.14 (0.21) 0.11 (0.27) -0.13 (0.28) 
             
Education (primary)             
Junior Certificate  -0.11 (0.31) 0.55 (0.37) 0.84** (0.39) 1.08* (0.56)  0.41 (0.56) 2.15* (1.14) 
Leaving Certificate -0.34 (0.32) 0.77** (0.36) 0.47 (0.40) 1.25** (0.55) 0.44 (0.53) 2.78** (1.15) 
Diploma/Certificate -0.66* (0.35) 0.37 (0.38) 0.32 (0.45) 1.24** (0.58) 0.48 (0.56) 2.39** (1.17) 
University -0.90** (0.38) 0.60 (0.39) 0.24 (0.49) 1.53*** (0.58) 0.34 (0.58) 2.40** (1.17) 
             
Married             
Living as married 0.53* (0.29) 0.15 (0.27) 0.83** (0.33) 0.37 (0.33) 0.01 (0.48) 0.60 (0.42) 
Single -0.12 (0.24) 0.10 (0.21) -0.00 (0.29) 0.23 (0.25) -0.06 (0.35) -0.21 (0.43) 
Divorced/Widowed/Separated 0.42 (0.28) 0.24 (0.28) 0.57* (0.32) 0.64* (0.33) 0.08 (0.45) 0.42 (0.44) 
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Social Class (AB)             
C1 -0.06 (0.26) 0.26 (0.23) 0.15 (0.38) 0.21 (0.29) -0.17 (0.40) 0.20 (0.39) 
C2 -0.15 (0.30) 0.28 (0.26) 0.55 (0.39) 0.16 (0.32) -0.19 (0.41) -0.31 (0.45) 
D 0.14 (0.33) 0.11 (0.30) 0.46 (0.43) 0.19 (0.37) 0.20 (0.44) 0.39 (0.48) 
E -0.07 (0.37) 0.33 (0.36) 0.74 (0.46) 0.01 (0.46) 0.22 (0.49) 0.59 (0.57) 
F 50 + -0.66 (0.41) -1.67*** (0.60) -0.77 (0.58) 0.01 (0.42) -1.53 (1.11) -0.60 (0.72) 
F 50 - -0.16 (0.64) -0.91 (1.11) 0.57 (0.77) 0.61 (0.77) 0.11 (1.08) 1.55* (0.80) 
             
Area (Town/City >1,500)             
Town/Village/Rural 
(<1,500) 
0.24 (0.17) -0.44*** (0.16) 0.53*** (0.19) 0.51*** (0.19) -0.57** (0.28) 0.92*** (0.28) 
             
Political knowledge 0.20** (0.10) -0.09 (0.09) 0.03 (0.11) -0.16 (0.11) 0.05 (0.14) -0.41** (0.18) 
             
Belief in God 0.11*** (0.03) -0.07*** (0.03) -0.05 (0.04) -0.05 (0.03) -0.11*** (0.04) -0.01 (0.06) 
             
MII (Failure of Political 
System) 
            
Public Services 0.71** (0.30) 0.25 (0.24) 0.21 (0.32) 0.14 (0.30) 0.34 (0.37) -0.18 (0.49) 
Economy/Public Finances 0.67** (0.26) 0.15 (0.22) 0.70** (0.28) -0.04 (0.28) -0.37 (0.38) 0.28 (0.38) 
Employment/Labour 0.74*** (0.28) 0.73*** (0.21) 0.58** (0.29) 0.30 (0.27) 0.20 (0.36) -0.13 (0.43) 
Taxes/Pension Cuts 0.77** (0.35) 0.24 (0.31) -0.20 (0.42) -0.04 (0.40) 0.20 (0.45) 0.05 (0.56) 
Other/Don’t Know 0.74** (0.35) 0.07 (0.33) 0.15 (0.41) -0.47 (0.46) -0.20 (0.48) 0.46 (0.48) 
             
Gov Policy Mainly 
Responsible for Econ 
Change (Yes) 
            
No 1.97*** (0.22) 0.02 (0.28) 0.35 (0.34) 0.56* (0.31) 0.22 (0.49) 0.07 (0.49) 
No answer/DK/Missing 1.42*** (0.29) -0.06 (0.33) 0.52 (0.34) -0.02 (0.41) 1.04*** (0.38) 0.64 (0.41) 
             
Constant -1.88*** (0.73) -0.20 (0.70) -0.32 (0.83) -1.84** (0.91) 0.26 (1.09) -4.51*** (1.41) 
Pseudo R2 0.12 
Observations 1,786 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table A10: Multinomial Logistic Regression on First Preference Vote/Vote Intention for 2011 General Election with past vote 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FF LAB SF Ind Other Refused/Don’t Know 
Reference FG             
             
Support Water Tax 0.03 (0.19) -0.10 (0.18) -0.93*** (0.31) -0.13 (0.21) 0.23 (0.27) 0.05 (0.30) 
             
Income (<€20,000)             
€20,000-24,999 -0.31 (0.40) -0.49 (0.38) -0.45 (0.41) 0.21 (0.43) -0.41 (0.51) 0.56 (0.68) 
€25,000-29,999 0.35 (0.42) -0.18 (0.41) -0.02 (0.49) 0.54 (0.50) 0.11 (0.54) 0.88 (0.68) 
€30,000-34,999 0.02 (0.38) -0.68* (0.36) -1.11** (0.49) 0.58 (0.39) -0.92 (0.59) 0.49 (0.69) 
€35,000-39,999 -0.03 (0.49) -0.19 (0.44) -0.43 (0.58) 0.21 (0.53) 0.31 (0.56) 1.39* (0.72) 
€40,000-49,999 -0.79* (0.45) -0.97** (0.40) -1.64*** (0.61) -0.41 (0.49) -0.72 (0.50) 0.60 (0.75) 
€50,000-69,999 -0.67* (0.40) -0.21 (0.37) -1.58*** (0.61) -0.03 (0.47) -0.39 (0.52) 0.66 (0.76) 
>€70,000 0.16 (0.53) -0.31 (0.46) -14.63*** (0.46) 0.27 (0.57) -1.01 (0.87) 0.91 (0.85) 
Refused to answer -0.47 (0.30) -0.38 (0.27) -0.68** (0.32) 0.01 (0.32) -1.20*** (0.40) 0.84* (0.49) 
             
Unemployed             
Full Time Employed -0.01 (0.35) 0.35 (0.32) -0.77** (0.39) -0.16 (0.36) -0.54 (0.47) -0.72 (0.51) 
Part Time Employed -0.46 (0.42) 0.52 (0.36) -0.52 (0.42) 0.48 (0.37) -0.48 (0.53) -0.78 (0.63) 
Student -0.18 (0.57) -0.43 (0.46) -0.31 (0.50) -0.55 (0.50) -0.36 (0.59) -1.64* (0.94) 
Retired 0.54 (0.43) 0.38 (0.44) -0.56 (0.54) 0.56 (0.48) 0.42 (0.60) -0.27 (0.66) 
House Duties -0.52 (0.42) -0.39 (0.39) -0.91* (0.46) -0.02 (0.42) -0.24 (0.56) -1.11* (0.66) 
             
Age -0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02) 
             
Female -0.00 (0.21) 0.11 (0.19) 0.07 (0.26) -0.05 (0.22) 0.29 (0.29) -0.29 (0.33) 
             
Education (primary)             
Junior Certificate  0.21 (0.36) 0.73* (0.43) 0.70 (0.45) 1.29** (0.59) 0.67 (0.59) 1.88* (1.01) 
Leaving Certificate 0.17 (0.37) 0.89** (0.42) 0.25 (0.46) 1.35** (0.59) 0.41 (0.56) 2.26** (1.03) 
Diploma/Certificate -0.32 (0.39) 0.41 (0.45) 0.25 (0.52) 1.30** (0.62) 0.46 (0.58) 1.94* (1.07) 
University -0.72* (0.42) 0.49 (0.47) 0.04 (0.55) 1.48** (0.63) 0.13 (0.61) 1.86* (1.07) 
             
Married             
Living as married 0.54 (0.35) 0.02 (0.33) 0.40 (0.43) 0.08 (0.39) -0.29 (0.52) 0.77 (0.50) 
Single -0.17 (0.26) 0.06 (0.24) 0.10 (0.36) 0.10 (0.27) -0.28 (0.36) -0.64 (0.49) 
Divorced/Widowed/Separated 0.60** (0.30) 0.63** (0.32) 0.70* (0.39) 0.62* (0.36) 0.15 (0.49) 0.41 (0.51) 
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Social Class (AB)             
C1 -0.08 (0.28) 0.31 (0.28) 0.05 (0.46) 0.28 (0.30) -0.16 (0.40) -0.01 (0.40) 
C2 -0.22 (0.32) 0.15 (0.30) 0.54 (0.47) 0.12 (0.34) -0.31 (0.43) -0.68 (0.50) 
D -0.00 (0.36) -0.03 (0.36) 0.27 (0.52) 0.15 (0.39) 0.10 (0.48) 0.17 (0.52) 
E -0.26 (0.43) 0.04 (0.43) 0.29 (0.58) -0.08 (0.46) 0.03 (0.51) -0.16 (0.61) 
F 50 + -0.46 (0.44) -1.46** (0.58) -0.78 (0.68) -0.00 (0.44) -1.42 (1.14) -1.00 (0.83) 
F 50 - -0.36 (0.66) -0.61 (1.09) -0.20 (1.15) 0.74 (0.74) 0.48 (1.10) 1.78** (0.88) 
             
Area (Town/City >1,500)             
Town/Village/Rural (<1,500) 0.34* (0.19) -0.17 (0.18) 0.58** (0.23) 0.60*** (0.20) -0.46 (0.30) 1.06*** (0.29) 
             
Political knowledge 0.15 (0.12) -0.06 (0.10) 0.12 (0.14) -0.15 (0.12) 0.08 (0.15) -0.06 (0.19) 
             
Belief in God 0.09** (0.04) -0.05 (0.03) -0.01 (0.04) -0.03 (0.03) -0.07 (0.05) 0.04 (0.06) 
             
MII (Failure of Political System)             
Public Services 0.88*** (0.32) 0.48* (0.28) -0.01 (0.39) 0.28 (0.31) 0.55 (0.39) -0.30 (0.54) 
Economy/Public Finances 0.80*** (0.28) 0.32 (0.27) 0.84** (0.33) 0.02 (0.29) -0.27 (0.41) 0.36 (0.41) 
Employment/Labour 0.95*** (0.31) 0.85*** (0.26) 0.38 (0.36) 0.34 (0.28) 0.32 (0.38) -0.06 (0.43) 
Taxes/Pension Cuts 0.92** (0.38) 0.35 (0.36) -0.74 (0.51) -0.04 (0.41) 0.12 (0.48) 0.26 (0.64) 
Other/Don’t Know 0.99*** (0.35) 0.21 (0.38) 0.00 (0.51) -0.39 (0.47) -0.06 (0.49) 0.17 (0.49) 
             
Gov Policy Mainly Responsible 
for Econ Change (Yes) 
            
No 1.61*** (0.24) 0.05 (0.31) 0.44 (0.45) 0.47 (0.33) -0.12 (0.51) -0.26 (0.47) 
No answer/DK/Missing 1.34*** (0.31) 0.12 (0.36) 0.61 (0.38) -0.03 (0.42) 1.05** (0.41) 0.10 (0.43) 
             
Vote 2007 Election (FG)             
FF 3.74*** (0.40) 1.63*** (0.26) 1.31*** (0.39) 1.37*** (0.28) 2.84*** (0.75) 1.23** (0.50) 
Labour 1.62* (0.88) 4.32*** (0.33) 2.63*** (0.54) 2.00*** (0.46) 4.68*** (0.79) -12.28*** (0.44) 
SF -20.63*** (0.68) 2.85*** (0.70) 6.37*** (0.66) 2.97*** (0.71) 5.31*** (0.98) 3.48*** (0.98) 
Ind/Other 2.45*** (0.70) 2.01*** (0.43) 0.98 (0.83) 3.02*** (0.39) 5.47*** (0.77) 1.31 (1.11) 
Don’t Know/Didn’t Vote 2.38*** (0.46) 1.67*** (0.29) 2.02*** (0.40) 1.29*** (0.33) 3.17*** (0.77) 3.86*** (0.48) 
             
Constant -4.98*** (0.86) -2.37*** (0.88) -2.62** (1.17) -3.41*** (1.01) -3.33** (1.39) -7.76*** (1.34) 
Pseudo R2 0.28 
Observations 1,786 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
